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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
State ex rel. Green v. Brown,"° though decided during 1962, was
well-covered in the 1961 survey of Ohio law. In this widely discussed
case the Supreme Court of Ohio reiterated the well-established principle
that it determines the procedure concerning admission to practice law in
Ohio. Under its present rules only natural persons may be admitted to
practice law, and unless the court decides to change its rules a corpora-
tion cannot be admitted to practice law in Ohio.3 The American Bar
Association has expressed serious doubts as to the wisdom of practicing
law as a corporation. However, it has taken the position that it is the
professional relationship, not the form, which is of controlling ethical
significance, and that the practice of law by a professional association does
not in itself constitute a violation of professional ethics. 2
PHILLIP ALLYN RANNEY
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
Coincident with United States Supreme Court action, the Ohio
Supreme Court further insured that the indigent criminal defendant will
have equal rights with the more affluent in appellate procedure. In State
ex rel. WVright v. Cohen' a writ of mandamus was issued against a com-
mon pleas trial judge requiring him to furnish an indigent defendant a
bill of exceptions without cost for the purpose of appeal. The trial court
had previously denied a motion requesting the transcript.
In a previous case from the same county,3 the Ohio Supreme Court
had held mandamus to be an inappropriate remedy. The basis for the
decision was that a full hearing was had regarding the question of
poverty, and the supreme court found that the trial court had exercised its
sound discretion in holding that the defendants were not indigent. In
the Wright case apparently no oral hearing was had regarding the ques-
tion of poverty, and there was no serious question as to the appellant
being indigent. Thus, the writ of mandamus was issued against the trial
judge and deemed to be the proper remedy.
In keeping with the liberal national trend, it now seems that in Ohio
a convicted defendant need only establish indigency plus the proper steps
30. 173 Ohio St. 114, 180 N.E.2d 157 (1962).
31. Excellent discussions of the Ohio Professional Association Law can be found in CAvrrcH,
OHIO CORPORATION LAW ch. 18 (1963); Vesely, The Ohio Professional Association Law, 13
W. REs. L. REV. 195 (1962).
32. Opinion 303, American Bar Association Committee on Professional Grievances, 1961.
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taken toward preparing an appeal to obtain a trial transcript. However,
if the statutory time for perfecting an appeal has elapsed and no motion
for leave to appeal has been granted, the court need not furnish the bill.4
On March 18, 1963, the United States Supreme Court rendered sev-
eral decisions affecting state treatment of indigent defendants. The Court
held that federal due process requires that an indigent appellant in a
criminal matter in a state court be assigned counsel to represent him on
appeal.5 The Court also held that a state court's denial of a free trial
transcript to an indigent appellant, on the ground that such appeal would
be frivolous, constituted a denial of due process.' The Court overruled
the famous doctrine of Betts v. Brady and held that fourteenth amend-
ment due process requires the assignment of free counsel to all indigent
defendants charged with crimes in state courts involving substantial jail
sentence possibilities.! This, of course, has been the law in Ohio for
many years.'
Ohio is faced with the new problem of providing both free counsel
and free trial transcripts to any convicted indigent who desires an appeal.
It would seem obvious that new statutes must be passed by the Ohio
legislature to effectuate the dictates of the Supreme Court and somehow
to limit possible abuses by indigent defendants.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
In State v. Vuin'0 police officers acting under an invalid search war-
rant (improperly signed) entered defendanes home and found gambling
equipment and policy slips. The police gave no notice of their inten-
tion to search until they broke in. The trial court granted a motion to
1. 174 Ohio St. 47, 186 N.E.2d 618 (1962).
2. State ex rel. Wilson v. McMahon, 172 Ohio St. 438, 178 N.E.2d 239 (1961).
3. Cuyahoga County.
4. State ex rel. Vaughn v. Reid, 173 Ohio St. 464, 184 N.E.2d 101 (1962); State ex rel.
Vitoratos v. Yacobucci, 173 Ohio St. 462, 184 N.E.2d 98 (1962); State ex rel. Lightfritz v.
Ogle, 172 Ohio St. 236, 175 N.E.2d 75 (1961).
In State ex rel. Vitoratos v. Walsh, 173 Ohio St. 467, 183 N.E.2d 917 (1962), it was
held that only one copy of a trial transcript is necessary, and an incarcerated indigent appellant
need not be furnished an extra copy.
Quaere: If an indigent appellant is incarcerated and without counsel, what good is a trial
transcript to him if he cannot see it?
5. Douglas v. California, 83 Sup. Ct. 814 (1963).
6. Draper v. Washington, 83 Sup. Ct. 774 (1963). See also Lane v. Brown, 83 Sup. Ct. 768
(1963), (decided the same day) which held that the determination of appealabity of a case
for the purpose of obtaining free records should not be vested in Indiana's Public Defender.
The Lane case and the Draper case point out the great difficulty in formulating methods to
prevent abuse of an indigent's rights after conviction.
7. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
8. Gideon v. Wainright, 83 Sup. Ct. 792 (1963).
9. OHio REv. CODE § 2941.50.
10. 185 N.E.2d 506 (Ohio C.P. 1962).
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suppress the evidence holding that a search of a home under a void war-
rant is illegal. The court went on to state that even if the warrant were
proper, the improper execution by breaking in without notice or service
of the warrant would render the entire search invalid.
In State v. Lett" a defendant failed to object to a search of his home
without a warrant until the contraband was found. The court held that
the defendant could not now object to the search because he had con-
sented to what would otherwise have been an illegal search. Federal
cases have distinguished between voluntary consent and mere acqui-
escence to authority. The questions of factual "consent" as well as
"standing to object" are likely to confront the Ohio Supreme Court in
1963. Some state courts have voluntarily followed the federal rules
after claiming not to be bound thereby.1"
HABEAS CORPUS
As usual, the supreme court as well as certain courts of appeals were
crowded with petitions for writs of habeas corpus. In Weaver v. Sacks
it was determined that double jeopardy is a matter which must be raised
by appeal and not by habeas corpus. Also the Ohio Supreme Court
held that habeas corpus will not lie for those now imprisoned as a result
of illegal searches and seizures.' 4 The court pointed out that rules of
evidence change from time to time, and a prisoner must appeal such
questions rather than sit back and await a more favorable judicial cli-
mate.
In Wells v. Sacks"6 the court held that the conditions set forth in
the Ohio Revised Code which provide for waiver of indictment must be
strictly followed. 6 A conviction based on an information obtained by
a defective waiver (lack of comprehension) is void and, therefore, sub-
ject to attack by a writ of habeas corpus.
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
The statute" requiring a defendant to give the prosecuting attorney
notice of an alibi three days prior to trial was held constitutional in
11. 114 Ohio App. 414, 178 N.E.2d 96 (1961).
12. State v. Trumbull, 176 A.2d 887 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1961); Leveson v. State, 138 So. 2d
361 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962); Belton v. State, 228 Md. 17, 178 A.2d 409 (1962); State v. Long,
177 A.2d 609 (N.J. Super. 1962); People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478 (1961).
13. 173 Ohio St. 415, 183 N.E.2d 373 (1962).
14. State ex rel. Spence v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 419, 183 N.E.2d 363 (1962).
15. 115 Ohio App. 219, 184 N.E.2d 449 (1962).
16. OHIo REV. CODE § 2941.021. It is interesting to note that although the court of appeals
approved in principle the grounds for the writ, when the matter was presented on evidence in
the supreme court, the petitioner was unable to maintain the burden of proof as to lack of
comprehension and was remanded. Wells v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 198, 188 N.E.2d 160
(1963).
17. OHIo REV. CODE § 2945.58.
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State v. Cunningham."8 The court based its decision on a somewhat
questionable prior Ohio Supreme Court case."9
In State v. Gerhardt" the defendant and two others were arrested
on the strength of a teletype message from out-of-state police that several
"safe men" were "going to pull a job." When arrested certain burglar
tools were found in the automobile in which the defendant was a pas-
senger. During trial the message was admitted in evidence over defend-
ant's objection. The appellate court reversed, noting that one element
of the crime of possession of burglar's tools is the intent to use such tools
burglariously and that the only evidence of such intent was the teletype
message which was dearly hearsay.2
Two interesting questions of evidence were presented in State v.
Scarberry.2  In that case objections were raised to the offering of a
confession into evidence on the grounds that it was involuntary and that
no corpus delecti had been proven. As to the former contention it was
shown that prior to confessing, the defendant was hit several times by a
law enforcement officer. Three hours later the defendant confessed to
another officer. The court held that there was no evidence that the force
used by the officer had any relation whatsoever to the defendant's con-
fession. It seems that the officer hit the defendant because of personal
anger at the defendant's alleged acts and not to obtain a confession.23
The defendant in this case was charged with murder in the first de-
gree of his two children. It was believed that the defendant drowned
his children in a river, but their bodies were never recovered. The court
held that corpus delecti need only be shown by some evidence. It was
held that (1) the defendant's being seen carrying the children toward
the river, (2) his appearing wet several minutes later without the chil-
dren, (3) his previous threats to drown the children, and (4) the fact
that the children were infants and could not fend for themselves, were
sufficient facts to establish corpus delecti.
SENTENCE
In State v. Lieberman24 the defendant was convicted of violating sec-
tions 2917.06 and 2917.07 of the Ohio Revised Code. Both the former
18. 185 N.E.2d 327 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
19. State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 176 NE. 656 (1931).
20. 115 Ohio App. 83, 184 N.E.2d 516 (1961).
21. The court went on to state, perhaps somewhat naively, that if the legislature would make
possession of tools without intent a crime, law enforcement officers would ensure proper en-
forcement. Id. at 92, 184 NE.2d at 523. However, it should be noted that since any tool
could be used by a burglar, this proposal would be extremely dangerous.
22. 114 Ohio App. 85, 180 N.E.2d 631 (1961).
23. Quaere: If the defendant were charged with petit larceny instead of murdering children,
would the confession be deemed voluntary?
24. 114 Ohio App. 339, 179 N.E.2d 108 (1961), appeal dismissed, 172 Ohio St. 478, 178
NXE.2d 506 (1962); cert. denied, 371 U.S. 925 (1963).
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section, a misdemeanor, and the latter section, a felony, deal with bribing
or corruptly influencing a witness. The trial court sentenced the defend-
ant on each section even though a single act comprised both offenses.
The court of appeals held that although both convictions were proper,
only one sentence should have been passed, and consequently the case
was remanded for proper sentencing. It is still quite unclear as to when
consecutive sentences are proper for one act and when one sentence only
is proper. The dissent in this case shows the lack of agreement on this
point.
One of the most complete discussions of the habitual offender stat-
ute25 is found in State v. Shank.26 The defendant in this case previously
had been convicted on a fourth offense, served a prison term, satisfactorily
served out his parole, and obtained a final release. And after his release, he
was indicted for being an habitual offender. The court held that the
habitual offender statute did not create a new crime but merely increased
the punishment for the previous offense. In the instant case, after the
defendant had been convicted for his fourth offense, he should have been
indicted at that time as an habitual offender. Then, upon conviction, his
sentence for grand larceny (one to seven years) would have been vacated
and replaced by a life sentence. The court of appeals reversed the trial
court and held that it was too late to charge the defendant as an habitual
offender. To so charge the defendant while no sentence is pending
against him treats the habitual offender statute as a separate and distinct
offense, which it is not.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
In a common pleas court decision," two parents were indicted for in-
voluntary manslaughter. It was alleged that the parents violated the
statutes28 relative to the neglect of minor children in that neither parent
was at home when apparently one of the children caused a fire which
resulted in the children's deaths. Neither parent purchased the matches or
placed them near the children. The court held that even if the parents
had violated the sections of the Revised Code dealing with neglect of
children, this violation was not the proximate cause of the children's
death. The court further refused to find the defendants guilty of neg-
lect, holding that neglect of minor children is not a lesser included of-
fense in manslaughter.
GERALD S. GOLD
25. OHio REV. CODE §§ 2961.11-.13.
26. 115 Ohio App. 291, 185 N.E.2d 63 (1962).
27. State v. Ross, 176 N.E.2d 746 (Ohio C.P. 1961).
28. OHIo REv. CODE §§ 2151.42, 3113.01, 3113.03.
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